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Abstract
Media, opinion leaders, co-ethnics, family members, and friends inuence our political decisions. The
ways in which these inuences a¤ect political cycles and (in)stability has been understudied. We propose
a model of a networked political economy, where agentschoices are partly determined by the opinions
of the individuals with whom they are connected in a xed inuence network. The model features two
types of individuals: ideological individuals who never change their views and who seek to inuence the
rest of the society; and non-ideological individuals who have no political allegiance and do not inuence
anybody, but who can be inuenced by ideological individuals with whom they are connected. We show
that inuence networks increase political turnout and cause non-ideological individuals who are subject
to antagonistic inuences to keep changing their political views. This in turn increases political cycles
and instability in two ways: (1) by reducing the number of stable and popular political leaders; and (2)
by worsening the tradeo¤ between political competition and the existence of a stable leader.
We uncover a necessary and su¢ cient condition that characterizes all of the political technologies and
network structures that guarantee political stability. This condition introduces a preference-blind stability
index, which maps each pair of a constitution and an inuence network into the maximum number of
competing political leaders that a society can a¤ord while remaining stable regardless of the extent of
preference heterogeneity in its population.
Our ndings have testable implications for di¤erent societies. They shed light on the network origins
of political cycles in two-party systems. They also imply that individualist societies are more politically
stable than collectivist societies and societies organized around ethnic groups or characterized by a high
level of homophilous behavior and inuences. For ethnic democracies, we quantify the exact tradeo¤
between political competition and stability, and show that ethnic fragmentation increases stability. The
ndings further provide a rationale for using the "divide and rule" strategy to maintain political power.
Finally, we nd that cliques and multi-layer cliques maximize the competition-stability tradeo¤, whereas
star networks, lines and rings minimize it.
Keywords : Political cycles, instability, inuence networks, homophily, ethnic democracy, competition-
stability tradeo¤.
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1 Introduction
Recent political events including the Arab Spring, the Occupy protest movement, and the 2014 Ukrainian
revolution have demonstrated the powerful role that social media and networks can play in destabilizing
a society and potentially bringing about political change. Social networks have also recently proven to be
an essential tool for political marketing in developed societies, as they are being used by political leaders
and parties to raise political awareness, garner support, and mobilize signicant shares of the population
to the polls. The importance of social networks for political participation has also been demonstrated by
the amount of e¤ort that certain governments invest into restricting access to communication technologies,
including telephone and Twitter communications, during elections in order to prevent the coordination of
street protests. In general, the people with whom we are connectedincluding opinion leaders, public and
private media, friends, colleagues, co-ethnics, and family members have a substantial inuence on our
political choices. Therefore, the impact of social networks on the extent to which the status quo is preserved
or is overturned is important.
In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the role of social networks in political cycles and (in)stability.
Given the high human and economic costs of political instability, it is important to analyze the factors that
make some societies more stable than others. Our analysis reveals that the network structure of a society
plays a crucial role in its level of stability, in addition to its constitution and its level of political competition.
We nd that social networks increase political instability in two ways: (1) by reducing the number of political
leaders who can govern the society in a stable manner; and (2) by increasing the tradeo¤ between political
competition and the existence of a stable leader. We are able to quantify this tradeo¤, while also showing how
it depends on the prevailing constitution (or political technology) and on the network structure of a society.
The ndings have testable implications for the comparative political economy of countries. For instance, they
reveal that collectivist societies and societies organized around ethnic groups or characterized by a high level
of homophilous behavior are more prone to political instability than individualist societies. The ndings also
shed light on the network origins of alternation in power in two-party systems, thus addressing an important
limitation of the classical model of a political economy. Furthermore, we provide a characterization of social
networks that maximize or minimize the tradeo¤ between political competition and stability, showing, for
example, the destabilizing properties of such popular networks as cliques and multi-layer cliques, and the
stabilizing role of star networks, rings, and lines.
1.1 Overview of the Model
We augment the classical model of a political economy by incorporating social networks. Within the classical
framework, a political economy is a human society endowed with a constitution and a collection of political
leaders or parties. Each leader has a distinct political platform, and therefore promotes a di¤erent vision of
how the society should be run. Citizens then form preferences over leaders. A leader is said to be unpopular
or unstable if his platform is less preferred by a constitutional majority than that of another leader.2
The main question addressed within the classical framework is that of the existence of a stable leader.
This important problem has been considered by a wide range of scholars, at least starting with Black (1948).
Their di¤erent analyses, which uncover structural conditions for the existence of a stable leader, have provided
important insights into the reasons why some societies are more politically stable than others.
2This notion of stability is classic (see, for example, Black (1948), Varian (1992, page 424)).
2
We consider the problem of the existence of a stable leader in a context where each individuals political
views might be inuenced by the opinions of other individuals.3 We assume the existence of a weighted
directed inuence network on which we impose no particular structure.4 The model features two types of in-
dividuals: ideological individuals (such as leftists and rightists in certain democracies like the United States),
who have strong political views that they never change and who seek to inuence the rest of the society; and
non-ideological individuals who have no political allegiance and do not exert any inuence on their neigh-
bors, but can be inuenced by ideological individuals with whom they are connected. During an election,
a non-ideological individual is a citizen who abstains unless he is persuaded by an ideological individual to
cast a ballot in favor of the leader or the party that he supports. The neutrality of a non-ideological person
may arise from the fact that he does not know the political leaders well enough to discriminate among them,
from the fact that he is clearly not interested in politics, or from the fact that he likes a particular aspect
of each leader but does not like any leader in all aspects. Within our framework, however, neutrality only
applies locally, as an individual might have strong preferences over a pair of politicians while being neutral
over a di¤erent pair.
Our simple model of inuence is inspired by Acemoglu et al. (2013). A non-ideological individual can
only be inuenced by his ideological neighbors. If all his ideological neighbors have the same political view,
then he will follow it. However, if his ideological neighbors have opposing views, his ultimate decision will
reect the cumulative weight of the links that connect him with the proponents of each view. In other words,
a non-ideological individual fully internalizes the possibly opposing opinions among his inuencers, and this
endows him with what can be characterized as a "fuzzy opinion" of each leader (see Zaddeh (1965, 1971) for
a rst formalization of the notion of fuzzy language and preferences). Such an individual therefore favors a
leader x over a competitor y to a degree determined by the cumulative weight of his ideological inuencers
who strictly prefer x over y, and favors y over x to a possibly di¤erent degree. In the context of elections,
this fuzziness translates into the frequency with which he favors one leader over a competitor. For instance,
depending on the relative weight of his inuencers who hold a particular view, he might vote for x against y
in two-thirds of all of the electoral contests between the two, and for y against x in one-third of the contests.
Our approach to modelling inuence characterizes non-ideological individuals essentially as swing voters.
The behavior of such individuals is qualitatively close to that of "regular" agents in Acemoglu et al. (2013)
as the latter regularly alternate their beliefs if they are connected with "stubborn" agents who hold opposing
views. This approach di¤ers from models in which an individual adopts a particular view if this view is held
by the majority of his neighbors (see, for example, Granovetter (1978)).
In order to study the inuence of networks on political stability, we extend the classical notion of stability
to our context. First, we introduce a new network-based measure of the likelihood of political instability
associated with each leader. This measure provides a description of the relative (un)popularity of competing
politicians. Building on this measure, we introduce the notion of the fuzzy equilibrium set, which describes
the probabilistic stability of each leader against each of his competitors. It can be used to compute the
3See, for example, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944), Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), and Kearns et al. (2009) for empirical
evidence on political inuence. Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2014) also show that, during Egypts Arab Spring, the number
of protesters in Tahrir Square was increasing with the number of tweets generated by Egyptian Twitter users to mobilize
masses. Also, a paramount chief from Kono district in Sierra Leone, answering a question about whether he was able to exert
any inuence on peoples voting decisions in elections, said: "if I say left they go left, if I say right they go right" (Acemoglu,
Reed and Robinson (2013). There is a broad empirical literature showing the e¤ect of networks on opinion formation.
4The weight of an inuence link may have several interpretations. It might be a measure of the extent to which an individual
trusts another individual with whom he is connected (see Acemoglu et al. (2013)), the level of persuasion that an opinion
leader, a village chief, or a television channel exerts on an uninformed individual; or the amount of money spent on advertising
by a political party to win the support of a non-ideological individual.
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probability of a politician being defeated by a competitor in a pairwise election, or the frequency at which
political parties alternate or rotate in power in a two party-system like that in the United States.
We also dene the certainty equilibrium set, which is the set of political leaders who are stable against
each of the other leaders with a probability equal to one. Obviously, the politicians in this set are those whose
leadership is sought after by the society, especially given the high desirability of political stability. A society
is said to be politically stable if its certainty equilibrium set is never empty regardless of the preferences of
the people and their social inuences.
1.2 Overview of the Results
We have descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive ndings. In order to determine the causes of political
instability in a society, we examine the economic properties of its certainty equilibrium set. We rationalize
this set by showing that each of its elements is maximal with respect to a binary relation that generalizes
the majority relation used in Black (1948) (Theorem 1). We also show that the certainty equilibrium
set can be empty. This possibility implies that a society can be thrust into an endless cycle of leadership
unpopularity and instability. We nd that political instability is determined by the constitution, the network
structure, and the level of political competition within the society. A comparative statics analysis implies
that, holding the constitution and the number of competing leaders constant, increasing the number of social
connections increases the level of political turnout, which in turn increases the likelihood of political change
and instability. This increases the probability of an initially stable leader becoming unstable due to network
inuences, and thus reduces the size of the certainty equilibrium set. Social networks therefore rene the
certainty equilibrium set (Theorem 2). Although this renement might be viewed as a positive property
of networks if one cares about the uniqueness of the equilibrium, it might also lead to a complete social
destabilization by eradicating leaders who can govern the society in a stable manner, as is illustrated in
Examples 1 and 2. These examples show that a peaceful society can easily slip into a cycle of political
instability due to a change in the structure of its social network. An important implication of Theorem 2,
as illustrated by these examples, is that the "divide and rule" strategy can be used to maintain the status
quo, as this strategy reduces the number of connections in a the prevailing network.
The high desirability of political stability forces us to identify conditions on the structure of a political
economy under which stability is guaranteed. Put another way, what are the forms of constitution, the
number of competing political leaders, and the network structures that guarantee political stability in a
society regardless of the extent of diversity in the political views of its people? Our analysis leads to a
necessary and su¢ cient condition under which political stability is always achieved (Theorem 3). This result
introduces a preference-blind index of political stability, a function that maps each pair of a constitution and
a social network into the maximum level of political competition (measured by the number of competing
politicians or parties) that a society can a¤ord while remaining politically stable. Conversely, this condition
characterizes or prescribes, for each desired or exogenous level of political competition, all of the pairs
of constitutions and network structures that guarantee political stability regardless of the diversity and
dynamics of the opinions in the population.
It follows that, if the constitution, the network structure, and the level of political competition in a society
are known, then our characterization result can predict whether or not the society will always be stable.
Importantly, we do not need to know the (future) political preferences of the people to make this prediction.
If only the constitution and the network structure of the society are known, then our analysis prescribes
the number of competing political leaders or parties that should not be exceeded for the society to remain
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stable regardless of the extent of preference diversity in the population. Conversely, for societies that have
traditions regarding the number of political parties, our characterization result permits the identication
of all of the network structures and forms of constitution that ensure political stability. This identication
might be computationally challenging, but it is not impossible within our framework.
Our main characterization result can also be viewed as quantifying the tradeo¤ between political com-
petition and political stability. It shows that this tradeo¤ depends on the network structure and on the
political technology or constitution of a society. The analysis reveals that a high level of social connection
and a large number of competing leaders are two major threats to political stability. Similar to the nding
that shows that increasing the number of social connections reduces the certainty equilibrium set (Theorem
2), we conduct another comparative statics analysis that shows that increasing the number of social connec-
tions in a society decreases its preference-blind index of political stability (Theorem 4), and thus worsens the
tradeo¤ between political competition and the existence of a stable leader. As is explained in the next sec-
tion, we compute this tradeo¤ for several types of societies, while at the same time highlighting the testable
implications of our ndings.
1.3 Some Applications and Testable Implications
We present some applications and testable implications of our model, and feature some popular networks
that we nd maximize or minimize political instability.
Political cycles in two-party systems. Several countries have a system in which two major parties
dominate the political arena. The ways in which social networks a¤ect political cycles in two-party systems
has been understudied. Our ndings imply that, in the absence of social networks, change or alternation
in power is not possible, with the incumbent party remaining in power forever. Of course, this is a highly
implausible outcome, as alternation is observed in reality. We nd the presence of inuence networks to be a
source of political cycles in two-party systems (Proposition 1). Cycles arise from the uctuating behavior of
non-ideological voters who are subject to antagonistic inuences. Our model further allows one to compute
the frequency with which parties alternate in power, and this depends on the structure of the prevailing
inuence network. The analysis addresses an important limitation of the classical model of a political
economy, which implies that it takes at least three parties to create a political cycle.
Collectivist societies, ethnic democracies, and homophilous inuences. Our analysis also
has implications for how social interactions a¤ect political (in)stability in collectivist versus individualist
societies. The amount of interaction that exists among people varies widely across societies. Some societies
are characterized by a high prevalence of loneliness and individualism, whereas others, such as ethnic societies,
are characterized by a high level of interaction among members of the same ethnic group (see, for example,
Greif (1994), Rothwell (2010), Barth (1969)). Our analysis implies that collectivist or ethnic societies are
less likely to be politically stable than individualist societies (Theorem 5).
In particular, in ethnic societies in which individuals have equal voting rights, we quantify the exact
tradeo¤ between political competition and stability, and also show how this tradeo¤ depends on the number
of ethnic groups. Our working assumption is that an individual can only be inuenced by co-ethnics (see
Greif (1994) for a justication of this assumption). An ethnic group is also viewed as a group of people who
have similar characteristics and exhibit homophilous behavior, thus making it easier for them to inuence
each other.5 We nd that, under certain natural conditions, a society is politically stable if and only if
5McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) argue that homophilythe tendency to associate with individuals with similar
characteristics"limits peoples world in a way that has powerful implications for the information they receive, the attitudes
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the number of its competing political leaders or parties does not exceed 2p rn q   1, where p is the number
of ethnic or homophilous groups, r is the number of individuals who are lonely and so are not subject to
any ethnic inuence, n is the total size of the population, and q (q > n2 ) is the number of votes required
to pass a decision (Theorem 6). Lonely individuals can be regarded as individuals who are emancipated
from their ethnic group and therefore cannot be inuenced by co-ethnics. It is clear that, as the number of
such individuals increases, there is a relaxation in the tradeo¤ between political stability and the number of
competing political leaders. In particular, if everybody is free from ethnic inuences (that is, r = p = n),
then the maximum number of political leaders that a society can a¤ord while remaining stable is nn q (the
mysterious Peleg number) minus 1, which is clearly greater than 2p rn q   1.
The analysis additionally shows that splitting a xed population to create a larger number of minor ethnic
groups (that is, increasing p) will result in more political stability, as population fragmentation increases
the stability index and therefore relaxes the competition-stability tradeo¤. In other words, countries with
many minor ethnic groups like Cameroon are more likely to be stable than countries that have only two
major ethnic groups like Rwanda or Burundi. This conclusion is especially true if the number of competing
political parties or leaders is much smaller than the number of ethnic groups. In fact, if the number of
political parties equals or exceeds the number of ethnic groups, then our analysis implies that political
instability is likely because, in that case, the number of parties is greater than the political stability index
(Theorem 3). Interestingly, it follows from empirical data that countries in which the number of parties
generally exceeds the number of ethnic groups are countries that have only a small number of ethnic groups
like Rwanda. Although Cameroon, for instance, has over 250 minor ethnic groups, it has only four or ve
major political parties, which might explain its relative stability. Importantly, our prediction that ethnic
fragmentation makes society safer is consistent with empirical research on the e¤ect of fractionalization on
internal conicts (Collier and Hoe­ er (1998)).
Instability-maximizing inuence networks. Our analysis shows that certain networks maximize
political instability by maximizing the tradeo¤ between political competition and the existence of a stable
leader. Such networks include cliques and multi-layer cliques. Multi-layer cliques reect the structure of a
hierarchical organization in which individuals in each layer inuence those in lower-level layers without the
inverse being true. We show that, under such networks, the index of political stability is two, which implies
that societies organized as a multi-layer cliques are highly prone to political instability.
Another interpretation of the nding is that a society organized as a multi-layer clique experiences a high
prevalence of alternation in power, even if there are only two political parties. This nding is surprising, as
it holds for any democratic rule, including rules that are known to be strongly biased toward upholding the
status quo, such as rules close to the unanimity rule. Under the closest rule to the uninamity rule (q = n 1)
in particular, the index of political stability is n under the empty network, which means that there exists a
political leader who will stay in power forever if the number of competing leaders does not exceed n 1. The
fact that the stability index suddenly drops from n   1 to two in the presence of a clique or a multi-layer
clique shows the powerful inuence of this network structure on political cycles. Within our framework,
cycles are induced by the changing opinions of non-ideological individuals who are subject to the inuence
of opposing ideological views.
they form, and the interactions they experience." They identify homophily in race and ethnicity as leading to the "strongest
divides" in society, which is consistent with Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2008) who show strong homoliphy in race in a sample
of high-school students in the United States.
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Instability-minimizing inuence networks. Our analysis also identies networks that minimize
political instability by minimizing the competition-stability tradeo¤ in a democracy. We nd that directed
stars, rings, and lines have this desirable property. A directed star, for instance, depicts a communication
system in which there is only one major source of propagandathe hub. This network structure therefore
limits the propagation of opposing political views, which ensures a certain level of stability. This nding
might explain why certain regimes maintain heavy control over private media in order to limit competition
with government-owned media. For instance, following the transition to competitive democracy in the 1990s
in most African countries, in each of these countries, there usually was only one television or radio channel
o¤ering national coverage; this channel was owned and used by the ruling party to inuence the political
views of the people. Media liberalization has been extremely slow, perhaps reecting the desire of political
rulers to avoid instability in power.
1.4 Plan of the Paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the contributions of our analysis to the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the concept of a networked political economy and presents our simple model
of inuence within networks. Section 4 formalizes the notion of political stability and presents the main
ndings. Section 5 shows applications to familiar societies and political systems, and also identies networks
that maximize or minimize the competition-stability tradeo¤ in democracies. Section 6 concludes. All the
proofs are presented in an appendix.
2 Contributions to the Related Literature
Our study bridges the literature on formal political economy and the literature on social networks. These two
areas are extremely broad and have developed separately. The literature on political stability has developed
at least since Condorcet (1785), who showed that a stable political leader may not exist in a society governed
by the majority rule. Subsequent studies uncovered the conditions under which a stable leader exists. Black
(1948) shows that political stability is guaranteed if voters have single-peaked preferences, a condition later
generalized by Dummett and Farquharson (1961). Peleg (1978) considers a more general preference domain,
and proves a necessary and su¢ cient condition on the maximum number of competing leaders for political
stability to be guaranteed. This paper mainly focuses on democratic societies in which people have identical
voting rights. His work is extended to societies with more general constitutional arrangements by Nakamura
(1979). By showing that political stability is intimately related to the constitutional arrangement and the
level of plurality of a society, the studies of Peleg and Nakamura have had an acknowledged impact on
the positive political economy literature (Austen-Smith and Banks (1999)) and have inspired a urry of
inuential studies on this topic.6
Our paper di¤ers from these prior studies by incorporating social networks into the classical model of a
political economy. Therefore, in addition to generalizing most of the key results obtained in these works,
we articulate new ndings on how constitutional arrangements and the geometry of inuence networks
determine political cycles and instability. In particular, if the inuence network is the empty network, we
obtain the results of the classical model. We also introduce new equilibrium conceptsthe fuzzy equilibrium
set and the certainty equilibrium setto gauge the risk of political instability in a society and measure the
6These papers are too numerous to cite, but see, for example, Moulin (1981), Schoeld (1984, 1985), Van Roozendaal (1992),
Banks and Duggan (2000), Konishi (1996), Schwartz (2007), Suzumura (2009), and the references therein.
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relative (un)popularity of leaders. Furthermore, we dene a new index of political stability, which shows
that the maximum level of political competition that a society can a¤ord while remaining politically stable
is a function of its constitution and its network structure. Conversely, this index also provides a complete
structural characterization of constitutions and network structures that guarantee political stability in a
society given a xed number of competing political leaders.
Our model of a networked political economy also predicts political cycles better than the classical model.
For instance, within the framework of the classical model, alternation in power is not possible in a two-party
system, which is not a realistic prediction in light of the empirical evidence on political cycles in countries
like the United States. Contrary to the classical model, our model not only shows that political alternation is
possible in such systems, but also predicts the frequency at which political parties alternate in power under
a given network structure. The analysis establishes inuence networks as the source of such outcomes.
The incorporation of networks into the classical model also leads to new analyses. For instance, com-
parative statics exercises reveal that the certainty equilibrium set is smaller with a higher number of social
connections. Similarly, the index of political stability is a decreasing function of the number of social con-
nections, which implies that less connected societies enjoy a greater level of political stability. These ndings
provide a rationale for using the "divide and rule" strategy to maintain political power. Furthermore, we
show that some popular networks, such as star networks, rings, and lines, maximize the index of political
stability, and therefore behave like the empty network in terms of minimizing the tradeo¤ between political
competition and the existence of a stable leader. When the level of political competition is not too high,
these networks rene the certainty equilibrium set without rendering it empty, which is a positive prop-
erty. Applications allow one to understand why individualist societies are more politically stable than ethnic
societies. To our knowledge, none of these results or applications have been obtained in prior studies.
As already mentioned, our simple approach to modelling inuence is closely related to the model of
Acemoglu et al. (2013), but we also di¤er in some respects. Their model involves two types of agents: stubborn
agents, who never change their views, and regular agents, who update their views according to information
that they receive from their neighbors. Stubborn agents seek to inuence the rest of the society, and are never
inuenced by other agents. This study nds that when stubborn agents di¤er in their opinions, the inuence
process never leads to a consensus among the regular agents. In our model, stubborn and regular agents are
ideological and non-ideological individuals, respectively. Like in the model of Acemoglu et al. (2013), only
ideological individuals inuence their non-ideological neighbors, and they cannot be inuenced. However,
our approach di¤ers from theirs in that non-ideological individuals in our model do not inuence their non-
ideological neighbors. This assumption is justied within our framework, as non-ideological individuals are
essentially either neutral or ignorant, and so gain nothing from inuencing their neighbors. Our assumption,
however, qualitatively leads to the same conclusion as theirs if the graph underlying the social network,
viewed as a binary relation, is transitive. Our model also di¤ers from theirs in that ours is static, though
the probability with which a non-ideological individual follows an ideological neighbor can be viewed as
being endogenously determined by a "monotonic" dynamic process.7 Despite these small di¤erences, we
essentially obtain results that are qualitatively similar in that non-ideological individuals who are connected
to ideological individuals with opposing views keep changing their political views. In the context of elections,
such behavioral uctuations translate into a probabilistic voting behavior. Our model also does not assume
that any non-ideological individual is (in)directly connected with an ideological individual, unlike their model.
7Any monotonic dynamic process results in the probability with which a non-ideological individual follows an ideological
neighbor being a non-decreasing function of the initial weight of the inuence link between the two.
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It follows that certain non-ideological individuals can abstain in equilibrium during the election day.
The use of weighted directed graphs to model social and economic interactions is standard in the economic
literature. Following studies that have used this class of networks to study the di¤usion of ideas, technology,
and economic shocks (see, for example, Jackson and Yariv (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Acemoglu
et al. (2013)), we assume that networks are exogenous in our analysis. Obviously, this is an appealing
assumption, since it allows one to study the distinct e¤ects of all the possible network structures within
the class of weighted directed networks. Our analysis indeed shows that the architecture of the inuence
network signicantly a¤ects the existence and the identity of stable political leaders, and has prescriptive
implications for the design of networks that maximize or minimize the competition-stability tradeo¤.
Our simple model of inuence shares some features with existing models, but it also di¤ers from these
models in signicant respects. An early contribution to the study of di¤usion is that of Granovetter (1978),
who introduced the threshold model. In his model, a complete network is assumed, and an agent chooses one
of two possible actions if the number of his neighbors who have taken that action exceeds a certain threshold.
Other models, surveyed in Jackson and Yariv (2011), generally assume a distribution of connections in the
population and a payo¤ function that depends on an individuals and his neighbors choice of a certain
behavior. Pongou (2009a) and Pongou and Serrano (2009, 2013) dene the contagion potential of a network,
which is a contagion index that assumes that an agent who exogenously or endogenously receives a piece of
information or is infected by a disease transmits it to his neighbors.
Our inuence model di¤ers from these prior models in that, in choosing between two actions (or two
competing political leaders in our case), a non-ideological individual connected with ideological individuals
fully internalizes the possibly opposing views of his inuencers, which endows him with what can be viewed
as a "fuzzy opinion" of each leader (Zaddeh, 1971, 1965). This fuzziness translates into the frequency with
which he chooses one leader over another. It follows that non-ideological individuals can be viewed as "swing
voters" in elections. In fact, in a two-party system, for instance, our model predicts that alternation in power
is rendered possible only by non-ideological voters who are connected with inuencers with opposing views.
Although some studies have recognized the inuence of social networks on political opinions and choices
(e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944), Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Kearns et al. (2009)), their goal
was not to formally analyze how the structure of the network a¤ects political cycles and (in)stability. A recent
and interesting study by Galeotti and Mattozzi (2011) shows that communication networks among voters
a¤ect partiesincentives to disclose information about their candidates, and increase political polarization.
In another interesting study, Perez-Oviedo (2015) examine how the characteristics of a network connecting
the citizens of a country ruled by a dictator determine the occurrence and success of an uprising. Our focus
and scope are completely di¤erent, just like our analytical framework.
Another distinctive feature of our study is that we derive testable implications for a wide range of
societies. In addition to shedding light on the network origins of political cycles in two-party societies as
already mentioned, our analysis also allows one to understand why some societies are more politically unstable
than others. Interestingly, the nding according to which collectivist societies and societies organized around
ethnic networks are less politically stable than individualist societies is consistent with empirical observation.
Within collectivist societies, ethnic fragmentation decreases instability, which is consistent with the ndings
of other studies (see, for example, Collier and Hoe­ er (1998) and Bates (1999)). These studies argue that
diverse societies are less cohesive, and therefore it is more di¢ cult to form a viable multi-ethnic coalition of
rebels to ght the status quo. Our analysis also has implications for the design of networks that minimize
political instability. The fact that networks like stars, rings, and lines, which are extremely popular in the
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literature and have been found to possess some appealing properties (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
Bala and Goyal (2000), etc.), minimize political instability proves that instability-minimizing organizations
are not hard to design.
3 A Networked Political Economy
A networked political economy is a human society N = f1; 2; :::; ng endowed with a political technology or
constitution f , a network R through which members of N inuence the political opinions of other members,
and a nite set of political leaders or social alternatives A. Each individual i 2 N has a preference relation
i over A. We formalize these concepts below.
3.1 Political Leaders
A political leader is a social alternative that may be imposed on the society. We view a political leader as
promoting a distinct political platform. We assume that the set A of political leaders is nite and contains
at least two elements. The number of leaders measures the level of plurality and political competition in the
society.
3.2 Political Technology
A political technology is a distribution of political power among the di¤erent subgroups of the society. It
is formalized as a function f which maps each subgroup S of the society into either 1 or 0. Furthermore
f(S) = 1 means that the members of S have the power to change the status quo to a new social alternative,
and f(S) = 0 means that S does not have such a power. We denote by 2N the set of all the subsets of N ,
and by W the set of all the elements of 2N such that f(S) = 1. We impose the following natural conditions
on W :
1. For any subgroups S and T such that S  T , if S 2W , then T 2W .
2. For any subgroup S, if S 2W , then N n S =2W .
3. W 6= ;.
Each subgroup inW is called a majority or a winning coalition. Condition (1) means that the enlargement
of a winning coalition by adding new individuals results in another winning coalition. Condition (2) means
that the complementary set of a winning coalition is a losing coalition. This condition is important since it
allows one to prevent the obvious political instability that arises from two non-overlapping winning coalitions
having totally opposing views. Condition (3) is a natural decisiveness condition.
A political technology as dened above may have several interpretations. It may be viewed as formalizing
the constitution of a society (e.g., Peleg (1978, 1984), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Winter (1996), Barberà
and Jackson (2004), Brams (2008), Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2012), Ray and Vohra (2014)). In such a
case, it provides a formal description of de jure or constitutional power. It can also be viewed as formalizing
de facto power, which is the power to change the status quo through means other than the constitution,
such as a military coup or a political revolt. In this case, f(S) = 1 means that any military coup or political
revolt initiated by the individuals in S against the current political regime, as illustrated by the 2011 Arab
Spring and the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, will succeed regardless of the actions taken by the individuals in
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N n S. It follows that a political technology is a formal description of the function that produces political
change in a society, be it constitutional or non-constitutional, peaceful or violent, or civilian or military.
3.3 Political Preferences: Ideological and Non-Ideological Individuals
Each individual i 2 N has a preference relation represented by a binary relation i on the set of political
leaders A. We assume that each preference relation i is:
 reexive: for any x 2 A, x i x;
 transitive: for any x; y; z 2 A, if x i y and y i z, then x i z; and
 complete: for any x; y 2 A, x i y or y i x or both.
The asymmetric and symmetric components of i, denoted respectively by i and 'i, are dened as
follows:
 For any x; y 2 A; x i y if x i y and not(y i x).
 For any x; y 2 A; x 'i y if x i y and y i x.
A preference prole is denoted by (i)i2N , and is sometimes denoted by R. We denote by U the set of
all the preference relations on A, and by UN the set of preference proles.
Let x and y be two political leaders, and i an individual. If x i y or y i x, we say that i is ideological
over the pair fx; yg. However, if x 'i y, we say that i is indi¤erent , neutral, or non-ideological over the
pair fx; yg. An individual may be neutral because he has perfect knowledge of the political alternatives and
values them equally, or because he does not know the alternatives very well and therefore cannot evaluate
them. The assumption that certain individuals might be non-ideological is realistic, and is supported by the
high level of abstention that is generally observed in real-life elections.8
3.4 Inuence Networks
An inuence network is a collection of weighted directed links between the individuals that form the society.
An inuence network is formalized as R = (g; (pi)i2N ), where g is a binary relation on N recording directed
links, and pi is a distribution of weight over the links of individual i. We formalize these concepts below.
Let i and j be two individuals. If i and j are connected by a link directed from i to j, we say that "j
is linked to i" or that i is an in-neighbor of j and j an out-neighbor of i, and it means that i can inuence
the political choice of j. This implies that j may act according to the political preference of i over a pair
of competing leaders if j is neutral and i is not. If i and j are connected by a link directed from i to j and
another link directed from j to i, it follows that i and j can inuence each other. If i and j are not connected
at all, it follows that neither can inuence the other. In particular, if i has no connection at all, which means
that i is an isolated member of the society, i cannot be inuenced and cannot inuence anybody else. For
any individual i, we denote by g(i) the set of individuals with whom i is linked, and for any set of individuals
S, g(S) =
S
i2S
g(i) is the set of individuals with whom the members of S are linked. Therefore the set g(i)
is the set of inuencers of i and the set g(S) is the set of inuencers of individuals in S.
8According to the American Presidency Project, voter turnout was only 58.23% of the voting-age population in the 2008
U.S. presidential election, which was the highest participation rate since the 1970s. This implies that over 41% of the voting-age
population abstained.
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It follows from our denition of inuence that only non-ideological individuals can be inuenced. Non-
ideological individuals cannot inuence their out-neighbors and similarly, ideological individuals cannot be
inuenced by their in-neighbors.
For each individual i, the distribution of weight pi = (pi(j))j2g(i) measures the amount of inuence that
each inuencer j of i has on the latter. We normalize pi so that
P
j2g(i)
pi(j) = 1 if g(i) is not empty, and we
interpret pi(j) as the probability that i will follow the preference of j if i is neutral and j is not and all the
other inuencers of i hold a view opposite to that of j.
In general, the inuencers of an individual i may have opposing political views. We compute the proba-
bility with which i supports one option against another option as a function of the weighted number of his
inuencers who support each option. To be precise, let x and y be two political leaders, and (i)i2N be a
preference prole. The society N can be partitioned into three sets: the set of individuals who prefer x over
y, denoted Nxy; the set of individuals who prefer y over x, denoted Nyx; and the set of individuals who are
neutral, denoted N(xy).
Figure 1: An inuence network
Individuals 1 and 5 have opposing views over two politicians x and y, whereas the other
individuals are neutral. For instance, individuals 2 and 5 follow individual 1 with probabilities
1/3 and 2/3, respectively, whereas individual 3 follows 1 with a probability of 1
Denote respectively by pixy, p
i
yx and p
i
(yx) the probabilities with which i chooses x over y, chooses y over
x, and abstains between the two. These probabilities are set out hereunder.
 If i 2 Nxy, then pixy = 1, piyx = 0 and pi(yx) = 0.
 If i 2 Nyx, then pixy = 0, piyx = 1 and pi(yx) = 0.
 If i 2 N(xy), then denote by g(i) \ Nxy the set of is inuencers who prefer x over y, by g(i) \ Nyx
the set of is inuencers who prefer y over x, and by g(i) \ N(xy) the set of is inuencers who are
indi¤erent. Let ixy =
P
j2g(i)\Nxy
pi(j), iyx =
P
j2g(i)\Nyx
pi(j) and i(yx) =
P
j2g(i)\N(yx)
pi(j) be their
respective weights. The computation of pixy, p
i
yx and p
i
(yx) is set out hereunder.
Dene by XT the indicator function of property T :
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X[T ] =
8><>:
1 if T is satised
0 if not.
The probabilities pixy, p
i
yx and p
i
(yx) are computed as follows:
pixy =
8>><>>:
ixyX[g(i)\Nxy 6=;]
ixyX[g(i)\Nxy 6=;]+iyxX[g(i)\Nyx 6=;] if g(i) \Nxy 6= ; or g(i) \Nyx 6= ;
0 if g(i) \Nxy = g(i) \Nyx = ;.
piyx =
8>><>>:
iyxX[g(i)\Nxy 6=;]
ixyX[g(i)\Nxy 6=;]+iyxX[g(i)\Nyx 6=;] if g(i) \Nxy 6= ; or g(i) \Nyx 6= ;
0 if g(i) \Nxy = g(i) \Nyx = ;.
pi(xy) = 1 X[g(i)\[Nxy[Nyx]=g(i)].
It follows that, if i is indi¤erent between x and y, i will choose x (resp. y) with a probability that reects
the cumulative weight that his inuencers who support x over y (resp. y over x) have relative to the total
weight of all his inuencers who have an ideological view. It is a natural model of inuence which has the
avor of the model developed by Acemoglu et al. (2013). In particular, our model, like their model, implies
that a non-ideological individual connected with inuencers who have opposing views will continue changing
his political views. In our framework, when pixy and p
i
yx are both strictly positive for a non-ideological
individual i, i is best viewed as having a "fuzzy" behavior (Zadeh, 1965, 1971)).
In the context of elections, behavioral fuzziness within our framework translates into probabilistic voting,
which implies that non-ideological individuals who are subject to opposing inuences are swing voters.
Indeed, assuming that multiple elections involving two political parties x and y are organized, if for any
individual i, pixy and p
i
yx are strictly positive, it means that i will vote for x in some elections and for y in
other elections, pixy and p
i
yx being respectively the proportions of elections in which i favors x over y and y
over x.
We note that we can derive pixy and p
i
yx by analyzing the average behavior of individual i in a dynamic
model of inuence by appropriately modifying the model proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2013) to t within
our framework. In this case, pixy , for instance, can be derived as the rst moment of a random variable
describing the long-run political behavior of individual i. If i is ideological over fx; yg, or if i is non-ideological
over fx; yg but is inuenced by ideological individuals who hold identical political views, our static model
yields the same prediction as Acemoglu et al. (2013). But if i is non-ideological over fx; yg and is inuenced
by ideological individuals who have opposing views over fx; yg, our actual calculation of pixy may di¤er from
theirs, even though our "qualitative" conclusion regarding the behavior of individual i is identical.
4 Political Instability
The analysis of political (in)stability and how it is a¤ected by social networks is the main purpose of this
paper. Classically, a political leader is said to be unstable or unpopular if he is less preferred by a majority
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of the people than another leader (Black, 1948).9 In the presence of social networks, we have seen that non-
ideological individuals support a leader with a probability that is smaller than one in general, and therefore
that the stability of political leaders is not certain, especially if non-ideological individuals are needed to form
winning coalitions. In what follows, we introduce the notion of the instability matrix, which determines the
probability with which each leader will be destabilized by each of his competitors in a political economy. This
notion is used to introduce two network-based concepts of equilibrium that generalize the classic concept
used in Black (1948).
Let E =(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) be a political economy, and x; y 2 A two political leaders. Let (Nxy; N(xy); Nyx)
be an opinion prole, and denote by 3N the set of all the opinion proles. The probability with which x
dominates or destabilizes y is given by :
P (x; y) =
X
S12W
(S1;S2;S3)23N
Y
i2S1
pixy
Y
i2S2
pi(xy)
Y
i2S3
piyx
The instability matrix of the economy E is given by the jAj  jAj matrix:
I(E) = (P (y; x))(x;y)2AA
The probability P (y; x) also captures the frequency with which leader x loses against leader y in a paired
competition as described in Black (1948). In the absence of social inuences (that is, if R = (g; (pi)i2N ) is
such that g is empty), one can show that P (x; y) is either 1 or 0, which implies that, in a two-party system for
instance, the party in power (the status quo) never loses against the opposition, which is not consistent with
reality. It follows that, by inducing swing voters, social inuence networks are a major source of political
cycles in such systems.
We dene below two equilibrium concepts based on the notion of the instability matrix. The rst is the
fuzzy equilibrium set, which captures the relative stability of political leaders against each other. The second
is the certainty equilibrium set, which is the set of leaders who are stable against each of the other leaders
with a probability of 1. Leaders in the latter set are those whose leadership is sought after, as they cannot
be unpopular.
Denition 1 Let E =(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) be a political economy.
1) The fuzzy equilibrium set of E, denoted F(E), is the set F(E) = f((x; y); 1  P (y; x)) : x; y 2 Ag.10
2) The certainty equilibrium set of E, denoted C(E), is the set C(E) = fx : P (y; x) = 0 for all y 2 Ag.
In a political economy E , ((x; y); 1  P (y; x)) 2 F(E) means that in a paired electoral contest between x
and y where x is the status quo and y is the challenger, x will not lose and therefore will stay in power with
probability 1   P (y; x). In other words, ((x; y); 1   P (y; x)) 2 F(E) means that the incumbent leader x is
stable against the challenger y with probability 1   P (y; x). A society is said to be politically stable if its
certainty equilibrium set is never empty regardless of the political preferences of its people.
9 In real-lile politics, the instability or unpopularity of a leader manifests itself in several ways. It shows through low approval
ratings, or it might take the form of a peaceful street protest or a violent demonstration. We do not single out any of these
forms of instability.
10The fuzzy equilibrium set is indeed a mathematically fuzzy set. By denition, a fuzzy set is a pair (X;u) where X is a
collection of objects and u a function that maps each element a of X into an element u(a) belonging to the interval [0; 1] (Zadeh,
1965)); u(a) measures the grade of membership of a into (X;u). We note that the fuzzy equilibrium set F(E) of an economy E
is a fuzzy set (X;u) where X = AA and u(x; y) = 1  P (y; x) for each (x; y) in X.
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Denition 2 A society S =(N;A;W;R) is said to be politically stable if for any preference prole (i)i2N 2
UN , C(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) 6= ?.
We illustrate these equilibrium concepts through the following example.
Example 1 Consider a political economy E =(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) where N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, A = fx; yg,
(i) = (xy; (xy); (xy); (xy); yx), W is the majority rule (a coalition is winning if and only if it contains at
least three individuals), and R = (g; (P i)i2N ) the inuence network given by:
g = f(2; 1); (3; 1); (4; 1); (4; 5); (2; 5)g (which yields g(1) = ;, g(2) = f1; 5g, g(3) = f1g, g(4) = f1; 5g and
g(5) = ;) and p2(1) = 13 and p2(5) = 23 , p4(1) = 35 , p4(5) = 25 and p3(1) = 1. The network is depicted by
Figure 1 in Section 3.4.
To compute the probability with which a leader beats his competitor, we rst need to list all the possible
opinion proles that lead to a victory of either leader over the other. This list is provided in Table 1 below:
Table 1
1 (123; A;B) with A [B = 45 9 (245; A;B) with A [B = 13
2 (124; A;B) with A [B = 35 10 (345; A;B) with A [B = 12
3 (125; A;B) with A [B = 34 11 (1234; A;B) with A [B = 5
4 (134; A;B) with A [B = 25 12 (1235; A;B) with A [B = 4
5 (135; A;B) with A [B = 24 13 (1245; A;B) with A [B = 3
6 (145; A;B) with A [B = 23 14 (1345; A;B) with A [B = 2
7 (234; A;B) with A [B = 15 15 (2345; A;B) with A [B = 1
8 (235; A;B) with A [B = 14 16 (12345; ;; ;)
The prole (123; A;B), for instance, means that, if individuals 1, 2 and 3 support x over y, the individuals in
A abstain, and the individuals in B support y over x, then x will win and y will lose. Similarly, if individuals
1, 2 and 3 support y over x, the individuals in A abstain, and the individuals in B support x over y, then y
will win and x will lose.
Figure 2: Stability and popularity relationship between x and y
x beats y with probability 7/9 and y beats x with probability 2/9.
This political cycle is induced by the non-ideological individuals 2,
3 and 4 under the inuence of the ideological individuals 1 and 5.
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The following table provides the probability with which each individual favors one leader over the other:
Table 2
i 1 2 3 4 5
pixy 1
1
3 1
3
5 0
pi(xy) 0 0 0 0 0
piyx 0
2
3 0
2
5 1
We rst compute the probability with which x beats y, its complementary being the probability with which
y beats x. In order to do this, we compute the probability with which x beats y under each of the opinion
proles listed in Table 1. We note that, if S = (S1; S2; S3) is an opinion prole where 1 =2 S1, then the
probability with which x beats y under S is Pxy(S) = 0: Likewise, if S = (S1; S2; S3) is such that 5 =2 S3,
then Pxy(S) = 0. For further illustration, we show below how we compute the probability with which x beats
y under opinion proles 1 and 2 in Table 1:
Pxy(123; A;B) = Pxy(123; 45; ;) + Pxy(123; 4; 5) + Pxy(123; 5; 4) + Pxy(123; ;; 45)
= 0 + 0 + 0 + 13 :
2
5 =
2
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Pxy(124; A;B) = Pxy(124; 35; ;) + Pxy(124; 3; 5) + Pxy(124; 5; 3) + Pxy(124; ;; 35)
= 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
The probability with which x beats y under each of the 16 congurations listed in Table 1 is presented
below:
S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Pxy(S) 215 0 0 25 0 0 245 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0
The probability with which x beats y is obtained by summing Pxy(S) over all of the opinion proles S,
which is 79 . One can also check, following the same steps as above, that the probability with which y beats x
is 29 . It follows that the instability matrix is:
I(E) =
 
0 29
7
9 0
!
The fuzzy equilibrium set is given by:
F(E) = f((x; y); 7
9
); ((y; x);
2
9
)g
The certainty equilibrium set is:
C(E) = ?.
This example shows that, if x and y are two political parties, they will alternate in power following a
political cycle such that x will be in power 79 of the times and x will be in power
2
9 of the times.
4.1 Inuence Networks Reduce the Number of Stable Political Leaders
In this section, we study the e¤ect of inuence networks on the number and identity of stable political
leaders. We show that the presence of inuence networks reduces the number of stable leaders by increasing
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political turnout, and may even thrust a society into a cycle of instability. To illustrate this point, consider
the following example in which we examine the existence of a stable leader in a networked economy and
contrast the outcome to the corresponding economy with an empty network.
Example 2 Consider a political economy E =(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) where N = f1; 2; 3g, A = fx; y; zg, W
is the majority rule (i.e., W = fS  N : jSj  2g), R = (g; (P i)) is such that g is a star network as depicted
by Figure 3 below (g = f(2; 3); (2; 1)g; P 1(2) = P 3(2) = 1 and P i(j) = 0 for any other pair (i; j)), and
(i)i2N is the preference prole described as follows: 1 : xyz, 2 : yzx, and 3 : (zx)y.
Figure 3 : A star inuence network
Figure 4 : Stability and popularity relationship between x; y and z
The inuence network depicted in Figure 3 leads to a complete destabilization
of the society where each leader is unpopular. In the absence of inuence links,
there would be one stable leaderx. In the presence of social inuences, leader x
is destabilized by leader z due to the inuence of individual 2 on the political
choice of 3 who is neutral between x and z.
It follows from these individual preferences that everybody is ideological, except individual 3 who, over
the pair fx; zg, is not. The popularity relationship among politicians is depicted in Figure 3. It shows that
a majority strictly prefers x over y with a probability equal to 1; similarly, y is preferred over z by another
majority, and z is preferred over x by another majority. On the other hand, the unpopularity of x against z
is the result of the inuence exerted by 2 over 3. In the absence of the existing inuence network, x would
be the only stable leader. But the prevailing inuence network leads to the destabilization of x, thus inducing
the economy to enter into a situation of political instability in which all leaders are unpopular.
We note that, in the absence of social inuences, the number of individuals expressing a strong opinion
over the pair fx; zg would be two, compared to three under the network depicted in Figure 3. It follows
that the presence of social inuences increases political turnout, and increases the probability of a cycle as a
consequence.
Examples 1 and 2 show that inuence networks increase political instability, possibly leading to a complete
destabilization of the society. Prior to formalizing this insight, it is important to provide a rationalization
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of the certainty equilibrium set by proving that each leader in this set is a maximal element of a domination
relation which we dene below:
Denition 3 Let E =(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) be a political economy. Dene on A the binary relation  as
follows. For any x; y 2 A, y  x if there exist two coalitions S and T such that:8><>:
T  g(S) and S [ T 2W;
y i x for all i 2 S and
x 'i y for all i 2 T
According to the binary relation , a leader is dominated if there exists a subgroup of ideological in-
dividuals who strongly prefer another leader and who, thanks to their inuences, can persuade certain
non-ideological individuals to join in forming a majority against the disliked leader. We show below that
each stable leader is a maximal element of the binary relation , a result that rationalizes the certainty
equilibrium set.
Theorem 1 Let E =(N;A;W;R; (i)i2N ) be a networked political economy and x 2 A a political leader.
x 2 C(E) if and only if x is maximal with respect to the domination relation .
Theorem 1 not only rationalizes the certainty equilibrium set, but it also proves that this equilibrium
concept is a generalization of the classic equilibrium notion used in Black (1948). In fact, if we assume
that R is the empty network, then our equilibrium concept coincides with Blacks. We also note that Black
considers only the majority rule, whereas we consider a much larger class of political technologies.
We now conduct a comparative statics exercise, generalizing the insights of Examples 1 and 2. If R1 and
R2 are two inuence networks, we say that the set of links of R2 includes the links of R1, denoted R1  R2,
if, for all i 2 N , g1(i)  g2(i). The following result shows that, holding the constitution and the preferences
constant, increasing the number of links within an inuence network renes the certainty equilibrium set,
and thus decreases the number of political leaders who can rule the society in a stable manner.
Theorem 2 Let E1=(N;A;W;R1; (i)i2N ) and E2=(N;A;W;R2; (i)i2N ) be two networked political economies
such that R1  R2. Then C(E2)  C(E1). This inclusion may be strict.
Theorem 2 establishes the fact that inuence networks rene the set of stable politicians. While this
renement might be regarded as a positive result if one cares about equilibrium uniqueness, it should also
be noted that it might lead to a complete destabilization of the society, as is illustrated in Example 2, which
is a negative property of inuence networks.
Remark that Theorem 2 also provides a rationale for using the "divide and rule" strategy to maintain
political power. To illustrate, consider Example 2 in which leader x is stable in the absence of any inuence
network and is unstable if agent 2 inuences agent 3 as is depicted in Figure 3. If leader x is in power,
he therefore has an incentive to sever the link between 2 and 3 to maintain himself in power. The "divide
and rule" strategy has been implemented by a large number of leaders, and continues to be used by several
regimes around the world in order to maintain the status quo (see, e.g., Castells (2000), Perez-Oviedo (2015)).
An example is Mobutu who ruled Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) between 1965 and 1997.
Castells (2000) notes the following about this leader:
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"Mobutu relied on a very simple system of power. He controlled the only operational unit of the
army, the presidential guard, and divided politics, government, and army positions among di¤er-
ent ethnic groups. He patronized all of them, but also encouraged their violent confrontation."
(p. 100)
Our model also implies a "strategic" use of the "divide and rule" strategy to maintain power. In fact,
if vertices 1, 2 and 3 represent distinct ethnic groups in Example 2, leader x, if in power, only needs to cut
the link between 2 and 3 to maintain himself in power. He does not need to sever the link between 2 and 1
for that purpose. It follows that if implementing the "divide and rule" strategy is costly, a ruling leader can
choose the set of links to sever in order to minimize the cost. Our model can be worked out to identify the
links that are to be severed for the purpose of preserving the status quo.
4.2 Inuence Networks Worsen the Tradeo¤between Political Competition and
Stability: A Preference-Blind Index of Political Stability
In Section 4.1, we analyzed political stability under the assumption that all the dening parameters of a
political economy, including peoples preferences, are known. In most situations, however, preferences are
not known. Yet, the analysis of political stability even in those circumstances is still very important. Can
we tell whether a society runs a risk of political instability if we only know its constitution, its number of
competing political leaders or parties, and its network structure? Our goal in this section is to answer this
question.
Our analysis reveals a tradeo¤ between political competition and political stability, and shows that social
networks worsen this tradeo¤, even undermining the stabilizing property of certain well-known constitutions.
The analysis is also useful for the design of constitutions and network structures that guarantee political
stability in a plural society, and has implications for the optimal level of political competition.
To measure the competition-stability tradeo¤, we introduce a preference-blind index of political stability,
which is a function  that maps each pair of a constitution W and a network R into a natural number
(W;R) 1 representing the maximum number of political leaders that a society can a¤ord for a stable
leader to exist regardless of the extent of preference heterogeneity.
Conversely, given an exogenous number of competing political leaders or parties p, our index provides a
full structural characterization of the constitutions W and networks R that ensure the existence of a stable
leader regardless of the extent of preference heterogeneity (i.e., (W;R) =p+ 1).
In order to dene our stability index, we rst need to dene the notion of a social circuit, which, intuitively,
is a collection of population subgroups which, by their power and social inuences, can thrust a society into
an endless cycle of political instability if they are endowed with certain preferences and if the level of political
competition is su¢ ciently high.
Denition 4 Let W and R be respectively the constitution and the network structure of a society N . A
circuit of (W;R) is a set S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sk; Tk)g such that for any t = 1; 2; ::k:
(i) St  N , Tt  g (St).
(ii) St [ Tt 2W and St \ Tt = ;.
(iii) [\ks=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ St = ;.
We denote by (W;R) the set of all the circuits of (W;R).
We now dene our preference-blind index of political stability.
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Denition 5 The stability index is a function  that maps each pair of a constitution and a network (W;R)
into the number (W;R) dened as:
 (W;R) =
(
+1 if (W;R) = ;
minf
S^ ; S^ 2 Gg if (W;R) 6= ;
We prove that a society is politically stable if and only if its number of competing political leaders is
smaller than its preference-blind stability index.
Theorem 3 Let S =(N;A;W;R) be a networked society. S is politically stable if and only if  (W;R) > jAj.
Although the proof of this result is quite involved, its intuition is simple. As noted earlier, a circuit
is a collection of population subgroups that can destabilize a society by holding highly opposing political
preferences. Therefore, if a society has no circuit (that is, (W;R) = ;), then obviously it cannot be
destabilized regardless of the number of political leaders, which is why  (W;R) = +1. If it has a circuit,
then let S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sk; Tk)g be the smallest circuit. We then show that, if there are at least
k political leaders, one can endow the members of the population subgroups in the circuit S^ with preferences
so as to create a situation in which, for each political leader, there is always a winning coalition that will
favor another leader with a positive probability.
When the network R is empty, we can show the index  (W;R) is equal to the well-known Nakamura
number. In general, however, the index is sgnicantly di¤erent from that number for nonempty networks,
as we will see later.
A straightforward implication of Theorem 3 is that a political system should be designed so as to limit
the number of competing politicians to a maximum of (W;R) 1 if we know W and R. Conversely, if
one knows that the number of politicians will never exceed a certain number p (e.g., in ethnic societies, the
number of political leaders generally reects the number of major ethnic groups) and if the network structure
of the society R is known, then one can design the constitution W so that (W;R) =p+ 1. The knowledge
of R, however, may be di¢ cult to obtain as networks are often dynamic and change over time. This means
that instability can suddenly erupt in a stable society as a result of a change in its network structure, as
is illustrated by the crucial role played by social media in the recent Arab Spring (see Acemoglu, Hassan
and Tahoun (2014) for Egypt; they show that the number of protesters in Tahrir Square increased with the
number of tweets sent by Twitter users for street mobilization. Note that the fact that Hosni Moubarak,
who was a stable leader prior to the street mobilization became unstable afterwards is consistent with the
prediction of Theorem 2).
The following result is a comparative statics exercise which shows that increasing the number of links
within a social network reduces the political stability index of a society, and thus worsens the tradeo¤between
political competition and stability.
Theorem 4 Let W be the constitution of a society, and R1 and R2 be two inuence networks such that
R1  R2. Then  (W;R2)   (W;R1). This inequality may be strict.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 4 that inuence networks increase political instability in two ways. First,
they reduce the number of political leaders who can govern the society in a stable manner, even sometimes
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leading to a complete destabilization. Second, they increase the tradeo¤ between political competition and
the existence of a stable political leader. The next section will present some testable implications of these
ndings for familiar political systems and societies.
5 Applications and Testable Implications
In this section, we apply our ndings to examine how social networks a¤ect political cycles and instability
in familiar political systems. We develop three applications. The rst application considers two-party
systems. The second application compares individualist and collectivist societies, with a particular focus
on ethnic societies or societies characterized by a high level of homophilous behavior and inuences. The
third application identies particular networks that maximize or minimize the level of conict between
political competition and stability in a democracy. This latter application is especially useful for the design
of organizations that seek to minimize conicts.
5.1 Political Cycles in Two-party Systems
Several countries have a political system in which two major parties dominate the political arena, such as
the Democratic Party and the Republican Party in the United States. Our analysis has implications for how
political parties alternate in power in such a system in the absence or presence of social networks. The result
below implies that, in two-party systems, alternation in power is only possible in the presence of inuence
networks.
Proposition 1 Let N be a society, W its constitution, and R its inuence network. Then, (W;R)  3 if
R = R0 (R0 is the empty network) and (W;R)  2 if R 6= R0. The last inequality may be binding.
Proposition 1 sheds light on the network origins of political cycles in two-party systems. Essentially, it
says that, in the absence of social networks through which ideological individuals can inuence the non-
ideological individuals with whom they are connected, it takes at least three political parties to induce a
change in power. This implies that, in the absence of social networks, the incumbent party remains in
power forever in a two-party system. Needless to say, this prediction is highly implausible in light of real-life
politics. The fact that political cycles are observed in several two-party systems is easily explained by our
analysis. Within our framework, the presence of inuence networks increases political turnout by mobilizing
non-ideological individuals to the polls, as is shown in Example 1. These non-ideological voters cast a
probabilistic vote in favor of each party depending on the relative amount of inuence exerted on them by
their supporters. These oating votes induce alternation in power in turn, leading to political cycles.
In our framework, non-ideological individuals who are connected with ideological individuals with op-
posing opinions can be characterized as "swing voters", as their voting behavior cannot be predicted with
certainty. As is already noted, a similar behavior characterizes "regular" agents connected with "stubborn"
agents with conicting views in Acemoglu et al. (2013). The knowledge of the exact structure of the in-
uence network allows for the computation of the frequency with which a non-ideological individual under
conicting inuences votes in favor of a party. It also allows to predict the frequency with which parties take
turns in power as a result of uctuating votes, as is shown in Example 1.
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5.2 Collectivist Societies, Ethnic Democracies, and Homophily
Our second application compares political stability in individualist and collectivist societies. In particular,
we determine a closed form solution for the exact tradeo¤ between political competition and the existence
of a stable leader in ethnic democracies, showing how this tradeo¤ depends on the number of ethnic groups.
5.2.1 Individualist versus Collectivist Societies
The amount of interaction that exists among people varies a great deal across societies. Some societies are
characterized by a high level of individualism, whereas others are characterized by a high level of interaction
among their members (e.g., Greif (1994), Rothwell (2010), Barth (1969)). Although the economic conse-
quences of social interactions have been widely studied, the ways in which social interactions a¤ect political
cycles and instability have been understudied. We examine this question in this section, analyzing political
stability across three distinct types of societies corresponding to distinct levels of social interaction: (1)
individualist societies, in which no connections exist among people; (2) completely connected societies, in
which any two individuals are connected; and (3) societies falling between these two extreme types.
An individualist or lonely society is characterized by the empty inuence network R0. We have shown in
Proposition 1 that the stability index of such a society is at least three, regardless of the prevailing political
technology or constitution.
A completely connected society is characterized by the complete inuence network, denoted C. A society
falling between an individualist society and a completely connected society is characterized by an inuence
network R whose graph strictly includes that of R0 and is strictly included in the graph of the complete
network C. The following result shows that such a society is more prone to political instability than an
individualist society, but is less prone to instability than a completely connected society, unless the prevailing
political technology is the unanimity rule (W = fNg) or is close to the unanimity rule (W = fN;Nn figg
for some individual i), in which case all three types of society are equally stable.
Theorem 5 Let W be the constitution of a society N , and  = jfi 2 N : Nn fig 2Wgj. Let R be a network
such that R0  R  C.
1) If   1, then  (W;R0) =  (W;R) =  (W; C) = +1.
2) If   2, then  (W;R0)   (W;R)   (W; C) = 2. These inequalities may be strict.
It follows from Theorem 5 (item 1) that, when the political technology is the unanimity rule or is close
to the unaminity rule, a stable leader exists regardless of the network structure and the level of political
competition in the society. In this case, networks do not play a particular role in the stability of the society.
However, they still determine the identity of stable and unstable leaders if preferences are known. And
although they generally increase the probability of a leader becoming unstable as implied by Theorem 2,
they do not eradicate stable leaders. Theorems 2 and 5 (item 1) therefore imply that, under the unanimity
rule or a near-unanimity rule, networks rene the certainty equilibrium set without emptying it regardless
of the extent of preference heterogeneity in the population.
If the political technology is di¤erent from the unanimity rule and the near-unanimity rule, Theorem 5
(item 2) implies that individualist societies are more politically stable than collectivist societies in general. In
this case, the stability index of a completely connected society is equal to two, which implies that the society
is prone to political instability regardless of the level of political competition. Note that this value is strictly
smaller than the stability index of an individualist society (which is at least equal to three), precisely implying
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that individualist societies can a¤ord a higher level of political competition than collectivist societies while
remaining stable It also implies that, for a given level of political competition, individualist societies are
more likely to be stable than collectivist societies. This nding might partly explain why Western countries
are more politically stable than less developed countries, as Greif (1994) observes that the former are more
individualistic.
5.2.2 Ethnic Democracies and Homophilous Inuences
In this section, we focus on ethnic societies governed by a democratic rule. These societies are a particular
kind of collectivist societies that is highly prevalent in the developing world. They are characterized by a high
level of homophilous behavior and inuences. Greif (1994) argues that such societies have a "segregated"
social structure, which is consistent with the argument of McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) that
homophily in race and ethnicity leads to the "strongest divides" in society. Such divides obviously limit
cross-group inuences, as people are mostly "involved in the lives of other members of their group", as noted
by Greif (1994). We analyze how ethnic divides and factions a¤ect the tradeo¤ between political competition
and the existence of a stable leader under a democratic constitution.
Our formalization of a democratic constitution follows the principle that all citizens have equal political
rights and therefore have equal inuence on social decisions. It follows that only the number, not the identity,
of people who support a particular social alternative matters in imposing that alternative on the rest of the
society. In order words, a democratic constitution gives decision-making power only to su¢ ciently large
groups, which are groups that are at least as large as an exogenous threshold (see, for example, Peleg (1978),
Jackson and Barberà (2004)). This threshold might vary depending on decision types. In order to be made,
some decisions require the approval of more than half of the population, whereas others require the support
of at least two-thirds of the population, and still others require the support of the entire population.
Formally, letW be a democratic constitution, and let q be the minimum number of votes that are needed
to pass a decision under W . For simplicity, we denote such a decision rule by q instead of W . A coalition S
is winning if and only if jSj  q. The third dening property of a political technology, which states that two
winning coalitions should always overlap in order to avoid obvious political instability, implies that q should
be greater than half of the population (n2 < q  n).
Let R = (g; (pi)i2N ) be the social network. We assume that the binary relation g is symmetric and
transitive. This e¤ectively implies that the society is segregated, having a certain number of groups that we
view as ethnic groups. These groups are technically the components of the network R (a component is a
maximal subset of g such that any two elements are directly or indirectly connected). Assume that there are
p groups N1, N2, ..., Np (p  2)11 , of which r are isolated or have only one individual member.12 Isolated
individuals might be viewed as emancipated individuals who are not subject to the inuence of their ethnic
group.
Denote by dxe the smallest integer larger than or equal to a real number x, and by bxc the largest integer
smaller than or equal to x. The following theorem presents the exact tradeo¤ between political competition
and stability in a democratic society organized around ethnic groups.
Theorem 6 The preference-blind political stability index of a democratic society under an ethnic network
11The case of p = 1 has been covered in the preceding section, as this case corresponds to a completely connected society.
12A partitioning of the population as is assumed here leads to what is popularly known as the "islands model" in the literature
on networks. This formalization is consistent with the description of collectivist societies provided by Greif (1994).
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R such as described above is:
 (q;R) =
(
2 if q  n  p+ b r2c
d 2p rn q e if q > n  p+ b r2c
Several practical implications follow from Theorem 6. One implication is that increasing individualism or
decreasing communitarianism by splitting a xed population to create a larger number of minor ethnic groups
relaxes the tradeo¤ between political competition and the existence of a stable political leader. In a situation
of extreme individualism, which corresponds to an empty ethnic network (that is, R = R0), all individuals
are isolated and so p = n = r and q > n p+ b r2c. Theorem 6 then implies that (q;R) = (q;R0) = d nn q e,
which is the well-known Peleg number (see Peleg (1978)). Remark that d nn q e > d 2p rn q e if p < n and q < n.
It follows that increasing individualism under a political technology di¤erent from the unanimity rule leads
to more stability.
In general, Theorem 6 shows how di¤erent social structures (captured by the variable p) lead to di¤erent
political-stability outcomes. It shows, for instance, that a country with only two extended families or two
ethnic groups like Rwanda (p = 2) is less likely to be politically stable than a country that is organized around
nuclear families. Indeed, imagine a country of 1 million people organized around nuclear families, with each
family having only two adults who can vote or express a political opinion. Then p = bn2 c = 500; 000. If that
country has two ethnic groups instead, then p = 2. As 500; 000 > 2, it follows that the stability index of the
country organized around nuclear families is greater than that of the country that has two ethnic groups,
especially if the political technology q is di¤erent from the unanimity rule (q < n). The lesson to be learned
is that, when political inuence is minimal, political instability is less likely. In other words, increasing
fragmentation results in greater stability. This prediction is consistent with other studies that have shown
that ethnic fractionalization makes societies safer (see, for example, Collier and Hoe­ er (1998) and Bates
(1999)). The main argument in this literature is that, because more ethnically heterogeneous societies are
less cohesive, it is more di¢ cult to form a viable multi-ethnic coalition of rebels to ght the status quo.
Theorem 6 further shows how a decision rule q can be chosen to minimize political instability given a
social structure p. It implies that, if the society is likely to be polarized (which corresponds to a small number
of ethnic groups or factions p), then q should be high for stability to prevail. In particular, if q = n (which is
the unanimity rule), stability always prevails as  (q;R) = +1. In general, the closed form solution provided
by Theorem 6 implies that, for a given or desired level of the competition-stability tradeo¤  (q;R), one can
always nd the value of q that matches that of an exogenous social structure p.
5.3 Social Networks that Maximize or Minimize the Tradeo¤between Political
Competition and Stability in Democracies
In this section, we identify certain network structures that maximize or minimize the tradeo¤ between
political competition and stability. It is a useful analysis, as it has implications for the design of organizations
and political systems that promote stability. We nd that cliques and multi-layer cliques minimize the
stability index, whereas star networks, rings, and lines maximize it.
5.3.1 Instability-Maximizing Social Networks: Cliques and Multi-layer Cliques
We show that cliques and multi-layer cliques minimize the index of political stability, and thus maximize the
level of conict between political competition and the existence of a stable leader. These network structures
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are modelled as weak orderings. They have one or multiple layers of inuence in which individuals in
each layer of the hierarchy inuence those in lower-level layers, without the inverse being true. Individuals
belonging to the same layer mutually inuence each other (see Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5: A two-layer inuence clique
Formally, we say that a network R = (g; (P i)i2N ) is a multi-layer clique if g is a weak ordering on the
society N . Assume that the symmetric component of g has p equivalence classes. We know that these classes
can be ordered as a sequence (N1; N2; :::; Np) where
p[
t=1
Nt = N . The interpretation is that individuals in
the top layer N1 can inuence each other and all the individuals in lower-level layers, and individuals in the
second layer N2 can inuence each other and individuals in the lower-level layers, and so on. If R has only
one layer, we say that R is a clique.
Figure 6: An n-layer inuence clique with one individual in each layer
Cliques and multi-layer cliques maximize the spread of conicting inuences,
which in turn maximizes the tradeo¤ between political competition and stability.
We show that the political stability index of a society connected by a multi-layer clique is two, which
implies that societies under such networks are highly prone to political instability.
Proposition 2 Let N be a democratic society endowed with a political technology q < n and connected by a
multi-layer clique R. Then (q;R) = 2.
Another interpretation of the result is that a multi-layer clique positively a¤ects political cycles, inducing
alternation or rotation in power with a strictly positive probability, even if there are only two political parties.
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The result is surprising, given the fact that it holds for any democratic constitution, including rules that are
known to be strongly biased toward the status quo, such as rules that are close to the unanimity rule. Under
the closest rule to the uninamity rule (q = n  1) in particular, the index of political stability is n under the
empty network, which means that there exists a political leader who will stay in power forever if the number
of competing leaders ia at most n   1. The fact that the stability index suddenly drops from n   1 to two
in the presence of a clique shows the powerful inuence of this network structure on political cycles. Within
our framework, cycles are induced by the changing opinions of non-ideological individuals who are subject
to the inuence of ideological individuals who have opposing views.
5.3.2 Instability-Minimizing Social Networks: Stars, Rings, and Lines
Although social networks increase the likelihood of political instability in general, in this section, we show
that certain networks like directed star networks, rings, and lines minimize the tradeo¤ between political
competition and the existence of a stable leader in democratic societies.
Star Inuence Networks A star inuence network is a network in which one individual inuences all
the other individuals (Figure 7). It captures social inuence in a context in which there is only one opinion
leader, or one television or radio channel that spreads propaganda.
Star networks are prevalent in real-world politics. For instance, answering a question asked by Acemoglu,
Reed and Robinson (2013) about whether he had any inuence on the political decisions of his people in an
election, a paramount chief in Sierra Leone said: "if I say left they go left, if I say right they go right." We
show how such star networks a¤ect political stability, even in situations where peripheral agents might not
follow the political opinion of the hub.
Formally, a star inuence network is a network R = (g; (P i)i2N ) such that there exists an individual
i0 2 N such that for any individual j 2 N :
g(j) =
(
N n fi0g if j = i0
; if j 6= i0
.
Figure 7: A star inuence network
Individual 1 is the only source of propaganda, which limits opposing political inuences.
This leads to the minimization of the tradeo¤ between political competition and stability.
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We show below that a star inuence network maximizes the index of political stability in a democratic
society.
Proposition 3 Let N be a democratic society endowed with a political technology q and a star inuence
network R. Then (q;R) = d nn q e.
This result implies that star inuence networks behave much like the empty network in terms of minimiz-
ing the tradeo¤ between political competition and stability. It follows that political alternation is less likely
when non-ideological individuals are not subject to conicting inuences than when political competition is
supported by multiple sources of propaganda.
Ring Inuence Networks A ring inuence network is a directed network in which each individual may
inuence one individual and may be inuenced by one other individual (Figure 8).
In a ring, each individaul has one out-neighbor and one in-neighbor who is di¤erent from his out-neighbor.
A ring inuence network is formalized as a network R = (g; (P i)i2N ) where for all j 2 N :
g(j) =
(
fj + 1g if j 6= n
f1g if j = n .
Figure 8: A ring inuence network
Like star inuence networks, rings minimize the tradeo¤ between political
competition and stability by minimizing the spread of conicting inuences.
We show below that rings maximize the index of political stability in democratic societies.
Proposition 4 Let N be a democratic society endowed with a political technology q and a ring inuence
network R. Then (q;R) = d nn q e.
This nding implies that rings behave like star networks in terms of minimizing the tradeo¤ between
political competition and the existence of a stable leader. They do so by limiting the spread of conicting
inuences.
Line Inuence Networks A line inuence network is a network in which each individual inuences one
individual and is inuenced by one other individual, except one individual who inuences but cannot be
inuenced, and another individual who may be inuenced but cannot inuence anybody (Figure 9).
A line inuence network is formalized as a network R = (g; (P i)i2N ) where for all j 2 N :
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g(j) =
(
fj + 1g if j 6= n
; if j = n .
Figure 9: A line inuence network
Like star and ring inuence networks, line inuence networks minimize the tradeo¤ between
political competition and political stability by minimizing the spread of conicting inuences.
We show that line inuence networks maximize the index of political stability in democratic societies.
Proposition 5 Let N be a democratic society endowed with a political technology q and a line inuence
network R. Then (q;R) = d nn q e.
This result implies that lines, like stars and rings, minimize the tradeo¤ between political competition
and the existence of a stable leader by limiting the spread of opposing political views.
5.3.3 How do Star, Ring, and Line Inuence Networks Di¤er From the Empty Network?
To complete this section, it is important to draw the di¤erence between star, ring, and line inuence networks
on the one hand and the empty network on the other hand in how they a¤ect political cycles and instability.
We have seen that these di¤erent classes of networks behave similarly in terms of minimizing the tradeo¤
between political competition and the existence of a stable political leader. However, they also di¤er in a
signicant respect. Unlike the empty network, stars, rings, and lines might signicantly rene the certainty
equilibrium set. However, they do not cause this set to be empty, unless it can be empty at a preference
prole in the absence of networks. It follows that, when the number of competing politicians is bounded
above by the index (q;R), these networks reduce the set of politicians who can rule the society in a stable
manner without eradicating them. This can be viewed as a positive property of these networks.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ects of social inuence networks on political cycles and instability. The analysis
has shown that inuence networks increase political turnout, and cause non-ideological individuals who
are subject to antagonistic inuences to continue oating their political views. This in turn increases the
likelihood of political cycles and instability in two ways: (1) by reducing the number of leaders who can
rule the society in a stable manner; and (2) by increasing the tradeo¤ between political competition and
the existence of a stable leader. We show that inuence networks can even eradicate the existence of stable
leaders, leading to a complete social destabilization.
Our main characterization of stable societies introduces a preference-blind index of political stability. A
higher value of this index indicates a greater level of stability. It maps each pair of a constitution (or
political technology) and a social network into the maximum number of competing politicians that a society
can a¤ord while continuing to maintain its stability. This nding has important implications for the design
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of stable societies. First, it prescribes the number of competing political parties or leaders that should not
be exceeded in a society with a known constitution and network structure. Second, for societies that have
laws or traditions regarding the number of political parties, this result characterizes all of the constitutions
and network structures under which political stability is guaranteed regardless of the extent of conicting
political views in the population.
Applications of the ndings provide insight into why some societies are more politically stable than others.
In particular, we nd that collectivist societies and societies organized around ethnic groups or characterized
by a high level of homophilous behavior are more prone to political instability than individualist societies.
We quantify the exact tradeo¤ between political competition and stability in ethnic democracies, showing
how it depends on the number of ethnic groups. In particular, we nd that more fragmented societies are
more stable in general. However, in societies where the number of political parties reects the number of
ethnic groups, the stability threshold is easily exceeded, thus increasing the risk of political instability. The
ndings further provide a rationale for using the "divide and rule" strategy to maintain the status quo leader.
The analysis also sheds light on the network origins of political cycles in two-party systems. In such
systems, the status quo remains in power forever in the absence of inuence networks. The presence of
inuence networks, however, increases electoral turnout and political turnover by mobilizing non-ideological
individuals to the polls. If inuenced by ideological individuals with opposing views, these non-ideological
individuals cast a probabilistic vote, which consists of voting in favor of a particular leader with a frequency
that reects the amount of inuence exerted on them by the supporters of that leader. Their votes therefore
uctuate over time, inducing political alternation in power. Interestingly, our model of a networked political
economy addresses an important limitation of the classical model of a political economy. This model predicts
that there will be no change in power in a two-party system, a highly implausible prediction in light of real-
life political outcomes. Our analysis shows that the incorporation of inuence networks into the classical
model yields more realistic predictions. Importantly, we also nd that if the network structure of a two-party
society is known, one can compute the frequency with which parties take turns in power.
We further identify popular network structures that maximize or minimize the tradeo¤ between political
competition and stability. We nd that cliques and multi-layer cliques maximize the competition-stability
tradeo¤, whereas star, ring, and line networks minimize it. It follows that, when the level of political
competition is not too high, these latter networks rene the set of stable politicians but do not eradicate
them, which is a positive nding.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Su¢ ciency
Assume that x =2 C(E). Then Px > 0 and there exits y 2 A such that P (y; x) > 0. This implies that
there exists (S1; S2; S3) 2 3N such that S1 2W and P(S1;S2;S3)(y; x) =
Q
i2S1
piyx
Q
i2S2
pi(xy)
Q
i2S3
pixy > 0.
We will show that S1  Nyx [ g(Nyx). Let i 2 S1. Suppose by contradiction that i =2 Nyx [ g(Nyx).
- If i 2 Nxy, then piyx = 0 and P(S1;S2;S3)(y; x) = 0, which is a contradiction.
- If i 2 N(yx) and i =2 g(Nyx), then g(i) \ g(Nyx) = ;, which implies that piyx = 0, and this is a
contradiction.
- If i 2 N(yx) and g(i) = ;, piyx = 0 and this is a contradiction.
Therefore, i =2 Nyx [ g(Nyx) implies i =2 S1, implying S1  Nyx [ g(Nyx).
We also have S1  Nyx [ [g(Nyx) nNxy]. Indeed if i 2 S1, i =2 Nyx and i 2 g(Nyx) nNxy, then i 2 Nxy
and piyx = 0, which is a contradiction.
S1  Nyx [ [g(Nyx) nNxy] implies that Nyx [ [g(Nyx) nNxy] 2W since S1 2W .
Now let S = Nyx [ fi 2 g(Nyx) nNxy : y i xg and T = fi 2 g(Nyx) nNxy : y 'i xg.
It follows from what precedes that: T  g(S), S [ T 2W , y i x for all i 2 S, and x 'i y for all i 2 T .
Necessity
Conversely, assume that there exist two coalitions S and T such that : T  g(S), S [ T 2W , y i x for
all i 2 S, and x 'i y for all i 2 T . Let us show that x =2 C(E): It su¢ ces to show that P (y; x) > 0.
Let S1 = S [ T . By denition, we have :
P (y; x) =
P
S12W
(S1;S2;S3)23N
Q
i2S1
piyx
Q
i2S2
pi(xy)
Q
i2S3
pixy
y i x for all i 2 S implies that S  Nyx. Furthermore, T  g(S) and (x 'i y for all i 2 T ) imply that
S [ T  Nyx [ [g(Nyx)rNxy]. It follows that Nyx [ [g(Nyx)rNxy] 2W . Now let:8><>:
S1 = Nyx [ [g(Nyx)rNxy]
S2 = fi 2 N : i 2 N(yx) and (g(i) = ; or g(i)  N(xy))g
S3 = Nxy [ [(N(xy) \ g(Nxy))r (N(xy) \ g(Nyx)]
It is clear that (S1; S2; S3) is an opinion prole of N and that S1 2W . We have:Q
i2S1
piyx =
Q
i2Nyx
piyx
Q
i2g(Nyx)rNxy
piyx =
Q
i2g(Nyx)rNxy
piyx > 0 because for all i 2 g(Nyx)rNxy, piyx > 0Q
i2S2
pi(yx) = 1 because p
i
(yx) = 1 if i 2 N(yx), and g(i) = ; and pi(yx) = 1 if i 2 N(yx) and g(i)  N(xy)).Q
i2S3
pixy =
Q
i2Nxy
pixy
Q
i2[(N(xy)\g(Nxy))r(N(xy)\g(Nyx)]
pixy = 1 
Q
i2[(N(xy)\g(Nxy))r(N(xy)\g(Nyx)]
pixy > 0 be-
cause for all i 2 [(N(xy) \ g(Nxy))r (N(xy) \ g(Nyx)], pixy > 0.
Finally, P (y; x) =
P
S12W
(S1;S2;S3)23N
Q
i2S1
piux
Q
i2S2
pi(xu)
Q
i2S3
pixu 
Q
i2S
piyx
Q
i2S2
pi(xy)
Q
i2S3
pixy > 0 and thus x =2
C(E). 
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Proof of Theorem 2
Let E1=(N;A;W;R1; (i)i2N ) and E2=(N;A;W;R2; (i)i2N ) be two networked political economies such
that R1  R2. If x 62 C(E1), then thanks to Theorem 1, there exist y 2 A such that y  x in E1. This
implies that there exist two coalitions S and T such that :8><>:
T  g1(S) and S [ T 2W;
y i x for all i 2 S and
x 'i y for all i 2 T
Since g1(S)  g2(S), it follows that T  g2(S) and S [ T 2W . Therefore, y  x in E2, and we conclude
that, thanks to Theorem 1, that x 62 C(E2).
Example 2 proves that the inclusion may be strict. 
Proof of Theorem 3
The following denition and lemma due to Suzumura (1976) and Lahiri (2002) will be needed in the proof
of Theorem 3. The denition is that of the extension of a binary relation.
Denition 6 Let R be a binary relation dened on a nite set A.
1) A cycle of R is a sequence (x1; x2; :::; xq) of distinct elements of B such that:
a) x1 R x2 R ::: R xq R x1; and
b) there exists c 2 f1; 2; :::; qg : xc <R xc+1.
2) A binary relation R0 dened on A is said to extend R if: x R y implies x R0 y and x <R y implies
x <R0 y.
The following lemma states that a binary relation on a nite set can be extended to an ordering if and
only if it does not have a cycle.
Lemma 1 A binary relation R dened on a nite set A can be extended to an ordering on A if and only if
R does not have a cycle.
The proof of Theorem 3 is below.
Su¢ ciency
Assume that a networked society S = (N;A;W;R) is not stable, and let R be a preference prole such
that C((N;A;W;R; R) = ;. Then the dominance relation has a cycle a1; a2; :::; ap 2 A of pairwise distinct
politicians such that: a2 dominates a1, a3 dominates a2, ..., ap dominates ap 1 and a1 dominates ap: Thus
there exist 2p coalitions S1, T1, S2, T2, :::; Sp, Tp  N such that for any t 2 f1; 2; :::; pg, Tt  g(St),
St [ Tt 2W , St  Natat 1 and Tt  N(atat 1).
Consider the sequence S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sp; Tp)g. The following statements are correct.
(i) : St  N and Tt  g(St).
(ii) : St [ Tt 2W , and since St  Natat 1 and Tt  N(atat 1) , it follows that St \ Tt = ;.
(iii) : If an individual i 2 [\ks=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ St, then for all s 2 f1; 2; :::; pg, it is the case that i 2 Ss [ Ts
and i 2 St. The preferences being transitive, i 2 Ss [ Ts for all s implies that at 1 i at. However, i 2 St
implies that at i at 1 and this is a contradiction. Thus [\ks=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ St = ;.
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The sequence S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sp; Tp)g is therefore a circuit. Since a1; a2; ::: and ap are pairwise
distinct, we deduce that jAj  p, implying that (W;R)  jAj.
Necessity
Conversely, let us assume that (W;R) = p  jAj. Let a1; a2; :::; ap be p distinct politicians and S^ =
f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sp; Tp)g 2 (W;R). Let B = fa1; a2; :::; apg. For every k 2 N , we dene a binary
relation Lk on B as follows: For any s 2 f1; 2; :::; pg :
1) if k 2 Ss, we suppose as 1 <Lk as;
2) if k 2 Ts, we suppose as 'Lk as 1.
For any x; y 2 B, x Lk y means that either as 1 <Lk as or as 'Lk as 1.
First let us show that there is no cycle for Lk , that is, there is no sequence x = (x1; x2; :::; xq) of distinct
elements of B such that: (a) x1 Lk x2 Lk ::: Lk xq Lk x1 and (b) 9c 2 f1; 2; :::; qg : xc <Lk xc+1.
Assume on the contrary that a sequence x satisfying (a) and (b) exist. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that x1 = a1. Then, by the denition of Lk , necessarily x2 = a2 and thus k 2 S2 [ T2.
Likewise, x3 = a3 and thus k 2 S3 [ T3, and iterating, we get xq = aq implying k 2 Sq [ Tq with p = q.
This means that k 2 \ps=1 (Ss [ Ts). But thanks to (b), xc <Lk xc+1, and we have k 2 Sc, which implies
k 2 [\ps=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ Sc. This is a contradiction.
Now, since Lk does not have a cycle, by Lemma 1, there exists an ordering Rk on B that extends Lk .
If k 62 [ks=1(Ss [ Ts), we associate with k the ordering x1 Rk x2 Rk ::: Rk xq Rk x1.
Finally, for all k 2 N , we extend Rk (which is an ordering on B) to an ordering on A by considering:
8a 2 B; 8b 2 AnB, a >Rk b. We have therefore dened a prole of orderings on A.
We now show that the certainty equilibrium set with respect to the prole just constructed is empty.
By construction, St  Natat 1 and Tt  N(atat 1) \ g (St). Since S^ is a circuit, St [Tt 2W . This implies
that at 1 =2 C(E). Thus for all a 2 B, a =2 C(E). Furthermore, every a 2 AnB is Pareto-dominated, which
implies that a =2 C(E). 
Proof of Theorem 4
Let (W;R1) and (W;R2) be such thatR1  R2 and S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sk; Tk)g a circuit of  (W;R1).
The following statements are true:
(i) St  N , Tt  g1 (St)  g2 (St) since R1  R2.
(ii) St [ Tt 2W and St \ Tt = ;.
(iii) [\ks=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ St = ;.
Thus, R1  R2 implies that a circuit of  (W;R1) is also a circuit of  (W;R2). This in turn implies that
 (W;R2)   (W;R1).
To show that this inequality may be strict, consider that R1 is the empty network and R2 is multi-layer
clique. We show in Proposition 1 that  (W;R1)  3 and in Proposition 2 that  (W;R2) = 2, implying that
this inequality may be strict. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
If R = R0, a circuit of (W;R) is reduced to a set S = fS1; S2; :::; Skg such that Ss 2W for any s = 1; 2; :::; k
and \ks=1Ss = ;. Our political stability index then becomes:
 (W;R0) =
(
+1 if (W;R0) = ;
min
 S , S 2 (W;R0)	 if (W;R0) 6= ; .
Suppose by contradiction that (W;R) < 3. Then (W;R) =2 given that (W;R) is always strictly
greater than 1. This implies that there exists a circuit S = fS1; S2g such that S1; S2 2 W and S1 \ S2 = ;,
which is a contradiction given that two winning coalitions always overlap. We conclude that (W;R)  3.
If R 6= R0, since (W;R) >1 by denition, it follows that (W;R)  2. To show that this inequality may
be binding, see the proof of part 2) of Theorem 5. 
Proof of Theorem 5
1) It follows from Theorem 4 that  (W;R0)   (W;R)   (W; C). To show the equalities, it therefore suf-
ces to show that  (W;R0) =  (W;R) =  (W; C) = +1. As-
sume that  = 0, then W = fNg. Let S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sk; Tk)g 2 (W;R). Then, for any
t 2 f1; 2; :::; kg, St [ Tt = N and \kt=1 (St [ Tt) = N . Therefore, we have [\kt=1 (St [ Tt)] \ S1 = S1 6= ;, a
contradiction. Hence (W;R) = ; and  (W; C) = +1.
Assume that  = 1. Then there exists an individual i 2 N such that W = fN;Nn figg. Let S^ =
f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sk; Tk)g 2 G. Then for any t 2 f1; 2; :::; kg, St [ Tt 2 fN;Nn figg, and thus
\kt=1 (St [ Tt)  Nn fig. But for any s 2 f1; 2; :::; kg, \kt=1 (St [ Tt) \ Ss = ;. Therefore, for any
s 2 f1; 2; :::; kg, i 2 Ss, which is a contradiction since \ks=1Ss = ;. Hence, G = ; and  (W; C) = +1.
2) Consider that   2. Again, the inequalities follow from Theorem 4. We need to show that  (W; C) = 2.
Since   2, there exist two individuals i and j such that Nn fig 2 W and Nn fjg 2 W . Let S1 = fig,
S2 = fjg, T1 = Nn fi; jg and T2 = Nn fi; jg. Then, S1 [ T1 = Nn fjg 2 W , and S2 [ T2 = Nn fig 2 W .
Furthermore, (S1 [ T1) \ (S2 [ T2) \ S1 = (Nn fjg) \ (Nn fig) \ fig = ; and (S1 [ T1) \ (S2 [ T2) \ S2 = ;.
Thus S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2)g 2 G, implying that  (W; C) = 2.
To see that the inequalities might be strict, it su¢ ces to nd a constitution W and a network R such
that W;R0) >  (W;R) >  (W; C). Consider a society of 90 individuals governed by a rule W under which
a coalition is winning if it contains at least 88 individuals. Individuals are connected by a network R whose
graph has three components, with each component being a symmetric and transitive relation. It can be
shown (see Theorem 6) that  (W;R0) = 45 and  (W;R) = 3. Since  (W; C) = 2, it immediately follows
that W;R0) >  (W;R) >  (W; C). 
Proof of Theorem 6
The following lemma is useful for the proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma 2 Let A1, A2, ... and At be t subsets of a set M of  elements each. If jM j = , then jA1 \A2 \
::: \Atj  t  (t  1).
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Let p 2 N be a natural number, a1; a2; :::; ap 2 A p politicians, S1; S2; :::; Sp  N p coalitions, and
s 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; pg. For any non-negative integer m, we write : as+mp = as and Ss+mp = Ss. Particularly,
ap+1 = a1, a0 = ap, Sp+1 = S1, S0 = Sp.
The proof of Theorem 6 is now ready:
Without loss of generality, write :(
N1 = fk1g, N2 = fk2g, :::, Nr = fkrg and
Nr+1 = fi1; iu+1g [N0r+1, ..., Nr+u = fiu; i2ug [N0r+u with r + u = p
Each of the components N1, ...and Nr is isolated, whereas each of the components Nr+1, ... and Nr+u =
Np has at least two individuals. Let L = N0r+1[ N0r+2 [ ::: [N0r+u. Remark that:
l = jLj = n  (2p  r).
If q  u + l + b r2c, it is obvious that N r L can be partionned into two disjoints sets S1 and S2 of
cardinality u+ b r2c each such that S1 \L 6= ; and S2 \L 6= ;, where bxc is the greatest integer smaller than
x. Thus, f(S1; L); (S2; L)g is a circuit, implying that R(G) = 2 = d 2p rn q e.
In the sequel we assume that q > u+ l + b r2c. Let v = q   l > u+ b r2c.
1) Let us show that (W;R) d 2p rn q e.
It su¢ ces to construct a circuit of (W;R) of length d 2p rn q e.
Order the individuals in N n L as follows: i1i2:::iuk1k2:::kriu+1:::i2u. For simplicity, we rename these
individuals as: j1j2:::juju+1:::j2u+r 1j2u+r where:8><>:
jq = iq for all q 2 f1; 2:::ug
jq = kq u for all q 2 fu+ 1; u+ 2; :::; u+ rg
jq = iq r for all q 2 fu+ r + 1; u+ r + 2; :::; 2u+ rg
.
Note that if r = 0, then the ranking is simply i1i2:::iuiu+1:::i2u and the relabelling gives j1j2:::juju+1:::j2u 1j2u
where 2u = p.
Now consider the following sequence of coalitions:
S1 = S1!v, S2 = Sv!2v, ..., Sk = S(k 1)v!kv, where the coalitions Stv!(t+1)v are constructed as follows:
S1!v = fj1; j2; :::jvg, Sv!2v = fjv+1; jv+2; :::; j2vg, ...,
Stv!(t+1)v = fjtv+1; jtv+2; :::j(t+1)vg with j(2u+r)+1 = j1, j(2u+r)+2 = j2,...
and more generally
j(2u+r)t+s = js for all integer t and 0  s  2u+ r with j0 = j2u+r.
One can remark that for all integer m > 1, if S1!v \ Sv!2v \ ::: \ S(m 1)v!mv is not empty) we have:
jS1!v \ Sv!2v \ ::: \ S(m 1)v!mvj = mv   (2u+ r)(m  1).
For example:
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S1!v \ Sv!2v = fj1; j2; :::jg
where
 = v   ((2u+ r)  v) = 2v   (2u+ r).
S1!v \ Sv!2v \ S2v!3v = fj1; j2; :::jg
with
 = v   ((2u+ r)  ) = 3v   2(2u+ r) (note that j2v+1 = j[2v (2u+r)]+1 = i+1)
and so on.
Now let w = d 2u+r(2u+r) v e and consider S = f(S1; T1); (S2; T2); :::; (Sw; Tw)g dened by :
S1 = S1!v, ... , Sw = S(w 1)v!wv and T1 = ::: = Tw = L.
We will show that S is a circuit of (W;R). Let t 2 f1; 2; :::; wg. We have the following:
(i) St  N , and by construction, St \ Nk 6= ; for all k = r + 1; r + 2; :::; r + u, which implies that
g (St) = [k=r+uk=r+1Nk. Therefore, Tt  g (St).
(ii) By construction, St \ Tt  St \L = ;, and St has exactly tv  (t  1)v = v individuals, and thus the
cardinality of St [ Tt is v + l = q. Therefore, St [ Tt 2W .
(iii) Now let us show that [
w\
s=1
(Ss [ Ts)] \ St = ;. We have:
[
w\
s=1
(Ss [ Ts)] \ St = [
w\
s=1
(Ss [ L)] \ St
= [(
w\
s=1
Ss) [ L)] \ St
= (
w\
s=1
Ss) [ (St \ L).
Since St \ L = ;, it remains to show that
w\
s=1
Ss = ;. But thanks to the remark above, j
w\
s=1
Ssj =
wv   (2u + r)(w   1), and by the denition of w, 2u+r(2u+r) v  w, that is, wv   (2u + r)(w   1)  0, which
implies that
w\
s=1
Ss = ;.
S is therefore a circuit of (W;R) with cardinality w = d 2u+r(2u+r) v e = d 2p rn q e ((2u+r) v = 2u+r+ l q =
n  q).
2) We now show that (W;R) d 2p rn q e.
Let w = d 2p rn q e. We will show that for all circuit of lengthm, we havem  w. Let C1 = f(L1;M1); (L2;M2); :::; (Lm;Mm)g
be such a circuit of (W;R).
Assume on the contrary that m < w. We assume that for all t = 1; 2; :::;m, jLt [ Mtj = q. Let
H = (L1[M1)\(L2[M2)\:::\(Lm[Mm) and C2 = f(S1; H); (S2; H); :::; (Sm; H)g where S1 = L1[(M1nH),
S2 = L2 [ (M2 nH), ..., and Sm = Lm [ (M3 nH). Since C1 is a circuit, C2 = f(S1; H); (S2; H); :::; (Sm; H)g
is also a circuit of (W;R).
Let us rst show that h = jHj  n  (2p  r).
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Since jNtj = 1 for all t = 1; 2; :::; r, H \Nt = ; for all t = 1; 2; :::; r. We will distinguish two cases.
First case. Assume that for any t 2 f1; 2; :::;mg and k 2 fr + 1; r + 2; :::; pg, St \Nk 6= ;. Consider an
individual itk 2 St \Nk. We claim that the following is impossible:
For any k 2 fr + 1; r + 2; :::; pg, i1k = i2k = ::: = imk .
Indeed, if there exists k 2 fr + 1; r + 2; :::; pg such that i1k = i2k = ::: = imk , then itk 2 S1 \ S2 \ ::: \ Sm,
which is a contradiction, as C2 is a circuit.
Therefore, for all k 2 fr + 1; r + 2; :::; pg, fi1k; i2k; :::; imk g has at least two distinct elements; that is:
jNk \ (
m[
t=1
St)j  2.
Therefore,
j(
k=p[
k=r+1
Nk) \ (
m[
t=1
St)j = j
p[
k=r+1
(Nk \ (
m[
t=1
St))j  2(p  r).
But we know that:
H  (N n
k=r[
k=1
Nk) n [
p[
k=r+1
(Nk \ (
m[
t=1
St))].
Thus,
h = jHj  (n  r)  (2(p  r)) = n  (2p  r).
Second case. Assume that there exist t 2 f1; 2; :::;mg and k 2 fr+1; r+2; :::; pg such that St\Nk = ;.
Let fN1; N2; :::; Ng be the subset of fNr+1; Nr+2; :::Npg such that there exist t 2 f1; 2; :::;mg and
 2 f1; 2; :::; g with St \N = ;.
The other (p  r   ) coalitions then satisfy:
For any t 2 f1; 2; :::;mg and N =2 fN1; N2; :::; Ng; St \N 6= ;.
Note that since H  g(St) =
[
k:St\Nk 6=;
Nk for all t, if St \Nk = ;, then H \Nk = ;. This observation
yields H \N = ; for all  2 f1; 2; :::; g. H is therefore a subset of:
[(N n
k=r[
k=1
Nk) n (
[
=1
N)] n
p r [
=1
(N \ (
m[
t=1
St)).
We can proceed as in the rst case to prove that jN\ (
m[
t=1
St)j  2 for all  = 1; 2; :::; p  r , implying
that j
p r [
=1
(N \ (
m[
t=1
St))j  2(p  r   ).
Hence, H  [(N n
k=r[
k=1
Nk) n (
[
=1
N)] n
p r [
=1
(N \ (
m[
t=1
St)) implies h  [(n  r)  2]  2(p  r   ) =
n  (2p  r).
Now, thanks to Lemma 2, for each St  N nH, jStj = q   h, we have :
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j(
m\
t=1
St)j  m(q   h)  (m  1)(n  h
= mq  mh mn+mh+ n  h
= n+mq  mn  h
= [n m(n  q)]  h
We assumed at the beginning that m < d 2p rn q e, this implies m < 2p rn q by the denition of dxe). But,
m < 2p rn q ) 2p  r > m(n  q)
) n  (2p  r) < n m(n  q)
) [n  (2p  r)]  h < [n m(n  q)]  h
) [n m(n  q)]  h > 0 since [n  (2p  r)]  h > 0
) j(
m\
t=1
St)j > 0
)
m\
t=1
St 6= ;
This is a contradiction since C2 = f(S1; H); (S2; H); :::; (Sm; H)g is a circuit of (W;R).
Finally, for any circuit of length m, m  d 2p rn q e, and thus (W;R)  d 2p rn q e. 
Proof of Proposition 2
To show that (W;R) = 2, we will prove the existence of a circuit of length 2. We distinguish two cases.
First case. Assume that jN1j  2 and let i and j be two individuals inN1. Consider C = f(S1; H); (S2; H)g
where : S1 = fig, S2 = fjg and H any subset of N n fi; jg of cardinality q   1. It is obvious that C is a
circuit of (W;R).
Second case. If jN1j = 1 and let N1 = fig. Consider any j 2 N2 and let S1 = fig, S2 = fjg and H be
any subset of N n fi; jg of cardinality q   1. It is obvious that C = f(S1; H); (S2; H)g is a circuit of (W;R).

Proof of Proposition 3
Call a family any collection of coalitions C = fC1; C2; :::; Crg such that for any t = 1; 2; :::; r, jCtj  q and
rT
t=1
Ct = ;. It is known that d nn q e = minfjCj : C is a familyg. We already know from Theorem 6 that
(q;R)  d nn q e. We are now going to prove that d nn q e  (q;R).
Let S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sk; Tr)g be a circuit of (q;R). Consider the family C = fC1; C2; :::; Crg
where for any t = 1; 2; ::r, Ct = St [Tt. Since S^ is a circuit, St [Tt 2W implies that jCtj  q. If
rT
t=1
Ct 6= ;,
then there exists i 2 N such that i 2 Ct for all t = 1; 2; ::k. But by the denition of the network, if j 6= i0,
then g(j) = ;. Thus, i 2
rT
t=1
Ct implies that i 2
rT
t=1
St and i 2 [
rrT
t=1s=1
(Ss [ Ts)]\St, which is a contradiction.
Hence, C = fC1; C2; :::; Crg is a family and therefore the set fjCj : C is a Pelegs familyg includes the set
fjS^j : S^ is a circuit of (q;R)g which means that d nn q e  (q;R). 
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Proof of Proposition 4
We already proved the following inequality: (q;R)  (q;R0) = d nn q e. Now let us prove that (q;R) 
d nn q e.
Let S^ = f(S1; T1) ; (S2; T2) :::; (Sr; Tr)g be a circuit of (q;R). Consider the family C = fC1; C2; :::; Crg
where for any t = 1; 2; ::r, Ct = St [ Tt. Since S^ is a circuit, St [ Tt 2 W implies that jCtj  q. We will
prove that
rT
t=1
Ct = ;. If it is not the case, then there exists i 2 N such that i 2 Ct for all t = 1; 2; :::; r.
 If there exists h 2 f1; :::; rg such that h 2 Sh !!(is it h 2 Sh or i 2 Sh)!!, then we get a contradiction
because S^ being a circuit, we have [\ks=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ St = ;.
 If for all h 2 f1; :::; rg, h 2 Th !!(is it h 2 Th or i 2 Th)!!, then, S^ being a circuit, we have Th  g (Sh)
and thus for all t = 1; 2; ::r, there exists ih 2 Sh such that i 2 g(ih). But since R is a ring, for all
j 2 N ,
g(j) =
(
j + 1 if j 6= n
1 if j = n
This implies that ih = i   1, where i0 = n: It follows that i   1 2 St for any t = 1; 2; ::r, implying that
i  1 2 [\rs=1 (Ss [ Ts)] \ St, which is a contradiction.
Hence, C = fC1; C2; :::; Crg is a family and therefore, the set fjCj : C is a familyg includes the set
fjS^j : S^ is a circuit of (q;R)g, which means that d nn q e  (q;R). 
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4. 
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